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PRIVACY GOVERNANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST (OR ARE PRIVACY VIOLATIONS AKIN 
TO INSIDER TRADING?) 
KIRSTEN MARTIN* 
ABSTRACT 
Currently, we frame individuals online as in a series of exchanges with 
specific firms, and privacy, accordingly, is governed to ensure trust within 
those relationships. However, the focus on the relationship between 
consumers and specific firms does not capture how the online environment 
behaves. The aggregation and secondary use of consumer data is performed 
by market actors behind the scenes without any relationship with 
consumers. Trusting a single firm is not enough; individuals must trust the 
online market in general. Such institutional trust has gone under-examined 
in regards to privacy online. Little has been done to measure how 
aggregating and using consumer data supports a larger online market and 
impacts institutional trust online.  
This paper explores how privacy governance should also be framed as 
protecting a larger market to ensure consumers trust being online. In a 
series of studies, I empirically examine (a) how typical secondary uses are 
judged along a generalized (for the good of the market) versus reciprocal 
(for the good of the consumer) exchange and impact institutional and 
consumer trust, and (b) whether governance mechanisms (limitations on the 
use of data such as adequate notice, auditing, non-identifiable information, 
limited storage, etc.) increase consumer trust in companies. I find: 
• Respondents find secondary uses of consumer data more 
appropriate if judged more within a generalized exchange 
(academic research) or within a reciprocal exchange (product 
search results) or both (credit security). However, most 
secondary uses of data are deemed privacy violations and 
decrease institutional trust online.  
• Using privacy notices is the least effective governance 
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2018) for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am grateful for support from the 
National Science Foundation under Grant No. No. 1649415. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the National Science Foundation. 











mechanism of those included here whereas being subject to an 
audit was as effective as using anonymized data in improving 
consumer trust.  
• Institutional trust online impacts a consumer’s willingness to 
engage with a specific online partner in a trust game 
experiment 
The findings have implications for public policy and practice. Secondary 
uses of information online need not only be justified in a simple quid-pro-
quo exchange with the consumer but could also be justified as appropriate 
for the online context within a generalized exchange. However, the majority 
of secondary uses currently popular cannot be justified as within either a 
general exchange or a reciprocal exchange and are judged inappropriate, 
violations of privacy, and decrease both interpersonal and institutional 
trust.  
Second, if privacy violations hurt not only interpersonal consumer trust 
in a firm but also institutional trust online, then privacy would be governed 
similar to insider trading, fraud, or bribery—to protect the integrity of the 
market. Punishment for privacy violations would be set to ensure bad 
behavior is curtailed and institutional trust is maintained rather than to 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trust makes markets work. Trust facilitates transactions, supports 
individuals entering a market, decreases the need for expensive safeguards, 
and limits bureaucratic inefficiencies. Sometimes trust is personal, such as 
when we decide to trust a local dry cleaner to take care of our clothes. Other 
times trust is more general, such as when I took my daughter to a hospital 











based only on the recommendation of a stranger.1  
For consumers concerned about privacy online, trust has been elusive. 
Online, consumers increasingly judge firms to be untrustworthy including 
firms who keep information for a secondary use,2 who partner with a data 
aggregator,3 or who store information.4 Regulators and scholars seek to 
understand how privacy is related to trust between market actors, e.g.,  
through the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) focus on informed choice 
within a relationship, through the promotion of information fiduciaries or 
data stewards that emphasize honesty and discretion within a relationship,5 
or through a more robust tort for breach of confidentiality between market 
actors.6 Such focus on interpersonal trust seeks to optimize transactions 
between market actors.7 When trust is insufficient and a market actor needs 
expensive safeguards to protect themselves against opportunistic partners, 
the actor considers alternative forms of governance, such as choosing a 
competitor, building out the competence themselves, or switching 
governance structures.8 Repeated bad acts by firms are identified and 
 
1. My daughter split open her hand playing basketball at a tournament in Teaneck, New Jersey. 
We live in Maryland. I asked a stranger for the nearest hospital, a few agreed on the best one, and, five 
minutes later, we walked in. The triage nurse took her vitals, a stranger gave her a few shots and took a 
needle to her hand. I showed someone a piece of plastic with insurance information. One hour later, she 
was back on the bench watching her teammates.  
2. Kirsten Martin, The Penalty for Privacy Violations: How Privacy Violations Impact Trust 
Online, 82 J. BUS. RES. 103, 104 (2018). 
3. Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public Records: An Empirical 
Investigation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 120 (2017). 
4. Pedro Giovanni Leon et al., Privacy and Behavioral Advertising: Towards Meeting Users’ 
Preferences, SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 6 (2015); JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., AMERICANS 
REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT 23 (2009); JOSEPH TUROW 
ET AL., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW MARKETERS ARE MISREPRESENTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS 
AND OPENING THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION 4 (2015); Blase Ur et al., Smart, Useful, Scary, Creepy: 
Perceptions of Online Behavioral Advertising, SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 4 (2012). 
5. As noted by Professors Richards and Hartzog,  
Missing from the individual view of privacy and security law is the more nuanced 
understanding that in a connected society, privacy is not just an individual concern, but a major 
building block for society as a whole. This is privacy’s trust gap. Our dominant legal framework 
is frequently insufficient or incapable of comprehending the real and important injuries to the 
trust we need to flourish in our networked, digital society. 
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1200–01 
(2017). Further, “Trustworthy data stewards have four characteristics that promote trust: they are honest, 
discreet, protective, and loyal.” Id. at 1213. See also Jack Balkin on information fiduciaries. Jack M. 
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C.D. L. REV. 1183 (2016).  
6. Rather than examining whether information is in public or private, Waldman suggests we 
examine if the information was shared within a trusting relationship. Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as 
Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 600–01 (2014). 
7. Brown et al. note an ideal situation where “[l]ow effort or bad quality is penalized by the 
termination of the relationship.” Martin Brown et al., Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market 
Interactions, 72 ECONOMETRICA 747, 747 (2004). 













handled in the market by other actors. Accordingly, privacy regulators and 
scholars attempt to facilitate trust within the relationship between 
individuals and firms.9 
However, the focus on fixing the relationship between consumers and 
specific firms does not capture how the online environment behaves.10 The 
majority of the work done in the online ecosystem of consumer data is done 
by market actors with no relationship with the consumer. Data brokers 
aggregate consumer data from different sources and sell information to 
firms who then use the information when it is not in a consumer’s interest.11  
These data traffickers “do not have a relationship with either individual 
users whose information they possess or with major platforms,” and “there 
is no contractual relationship between the data traffickers and the 
individuals with profiles in their databases.”12 Figure 1 depicts one vision 
of the anonymous online ecosystem of actors involved in consumer data. 
Such tracking is pervasive: on average, 25 third-party trackers are found on 
news, arts, and sports websites.13 In fact, data traffickers—to include those 
 
term, committed relationships in order to avoid “costly hierarchy.” Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Dealing 
with the Paradox of Embeddedness: The Role of Contracts and Trust in Facilitating Movement out of 
Committed Relationships, 19 ORG. SCI. 709, 710 (2008). See generally Peter Kollock, The Emergence 
of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust, 100 AM. J. 
SOC. 313 (1994); Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for 
Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85 (1995).  
9. And I have argued to fix the immediate relationship between user and firm in regards to 
privacy online, but here I argue such fixes are not enough. Kirsten Martin, Transaction Costs, Privacy, 
and Trust: The Laudable Goals and Ultimate Failure of Notice and Choice to Respect Privacy Online, 
18 FIRST MONDAY 12 (2013). 
10. One issue with focusing on transactions or relationships that is not covered here is that we 
miss systemic problems such as pollution, or where the harms fall on those outside the immediate (even 
trusted) relationship. For example, Peppet notes the third-party impact of disclosing information: 
“consumers may receive a discount for using a driving or health monitor, privacy may unravel as those 
who refuse to disclose are assumed to be withholding negative information and therefore stigmatized 
and penalized.” Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-
Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011). Lyon discusses the cumulative impact of a 
surveillance society. DAVID LYON, THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE 12 (2006). Ryan Calo notes the difficult 
of citizens to perceive and affect surveillance. Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 23, 23–24 (2016); Citron and Gray as well as Cohen summarize the generalized perception 
of society from the individual decisions to be surveilled; harms that are not captured in the individual 
exchanges. Danielle Keats Citron & David C Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply 
to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 265 (2013); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, 
Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (2008). Both Fromkin and Martin 
separately take this one step further by likening the cumulative harm from surveillance to pollution. A. 
Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental 
Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2015); Kirsten Martin, Ethical Issues in the Big 
Data Industry, 14 MIS Q. EXECUTIVE 67, 69 (2015). 
11. TEDx Talks, Why Companies Should Respect Our Privacy | Kirsten Martin | TEDx 
Charlottesville, YOUTUBE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iWINQiRQ9g. 
12. The term “data trafficker” is from Professor Lauren Scholz. Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy 
Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159746. 
13. STEVEN ENGLEHARDT & ARVIND NARAYANAN, ONLINE TRACKING: A 1-MILLION-SITE 
 











trafficking in the consumer data behind the scenes—are the market actors 
who make money under the current regime.14 
While we currently focus on optimizing interpersonal trust online as if 
we are in a market of local dry cleaners, consumers are facing a confusing 
market more akin to the medical system or financial securities, with many 
anonymous actors working behind the scenes to create the experience and 
deliver the service. In such a situation, generalized trust in the institution 
matters more because individuals cannot gain evidence of trustworthiness 
of specific individuals or firms.15 In other words, when information is not 
available about firms or the quality of the product, we rely upon institutional 
trust to uphold norms and quality standards.16 Institutional trust means the 
threat of opportunism of one firm does not matter as much because we trust 
the system to take care of bad actors.17 
  
 
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS 6 (May 18, 2016) 6, http://randomwalker.info/publications/OpenWPM_ 
1_million_site_tracking_measurement.pdf. 
14. Sarah Spiekermann et al., The Challenges of Personal Data Markets and Privacy, 25 
ELECTRON MARKETS 161, 161 (2015); Max Read, How Much of the Internet Is Fake? Turns Out, a Lot 
of It, Actually., NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Dec. 26, 2018, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/how-mu 
ch-of-the-internet-is-fake.html. 
15. “In the absence of previous relationships, the trustworthiness of a potential trustee primarily 
depends on two factors: the image of intermediaries that the trustor relies on for obtaining information 
about trustees . . . and/or the trustworthiness of institutions that back up trustees.” Dmitry Khodyakov, 
Trust as a Process: A Three-Dimensional Approach, 41 SOC. 115, 122 (2007). See also T. 
Yamagishi, Trust as a Form of Social Intelligence, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 121–48 (K. Cook ed., 2001). 
16. Trust can be at multiple levels: (1) trust disposition of an individual or a general tendency to 
trust; (2) interpersonal trust tied to person or market actor, based on social characteristics such as the 
trustworthiness of the trustee; and (3) a more generalized trust such as “institutional” trust, tied to formal 
societal structures, based on individual or firm-specific attributes or on intermediary mechanisms. 
Michael Pirson et al., Public Trust in Business and its Determinants 8–9 (Fordham Univ. Schools of 
Bus. Working Paper No. 2012-002); see Lynne G Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of 
Economic Structure, 8 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 53 (1986) (Professor Zucker focuses on trust in institutions 
rising in the U.S. with the spread of credentialing, a shift to service (rather than products), as well as 
regulation and legislation). 
17. Oliver E Williamson, Opportunism and Its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 












Figure 1: Infographic of online marketing18 
 
 
Institutional trust is not a unique phenomenon.19 When dealing with 
strangers, people still become vulnerable to others: “They walk into an 
unfamiliar branch office of their bank or into a hospital emergency room.”20  
Such institutional trust is regularly measured in larger systems with 
information asymmetries such as with banks, newspapers, congress, big 
business21 or in law and medicine.22 And privacy online has all the markers 
of a system that would rely upon institutional trust with anonymous actors 
outside the reach of consumers and information asymmetries wherein the 
consumer is the least informed.  
We treat interactions online as a series of exchanges with specific firms 
and justify tracking, sharing, aggregating, and using consumer information 
as within a reciprocal exchange between two parties. However, the 
aggregation and secondary use of consumer data, the subject of much 
concern, is performed by market actors behind the scenes without any 
relationship with consumers. A generalized exchange, where the benefits 
 
18. Scott Brinker, MARKETING TECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE SUPERGRAPHIC (2018): MARTECH 
5000 (ACTUALLY 6,829) CHIEF MARTEC (2018), https://chiefmartec.com/2018/04/marketing-technolog 
y-landscape-supergraphic-2018/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
19. See generally Pauline Ratnasingam et al., The Role of Facilitating Conditions and 
Institutional Trust in Electronic Marketplaces, 3 J. OF ELECTRONIC COM. ORG. 69 (2005); See also D 
Harrison McKnight et al., Initial Trust Formation in New Organizational Relationships, 23 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 473 (1998); Susan P Shapiro, The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 93 AM. J. SOC. 623 
(1987); Zucker, supra note 16. 
20. Shapiro, supra note 19, at 635. 
21. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Trust in Public Institutions over the Business Cycle, 101 
AM. ECON. REV. 281, 281–87 (2011).  
22. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 463–527 (2002). 
 











received are not directly related to the transaction but rather are for the good 
of the online institution, may offer a better explanation of consumer 
exchange online.23 A generalized exchange would suggest that consumers 
would approve uses of information that benefit a larger community or where 
the purpose and benefits are just—similar to the justification in other 
institutions with anonymous actors such as medical and financial systems. 
Little has been done to measure how aggregating and using consumer 
data supports a larger online market and impacts the institutional trust 
online. This paper explores how privacy governance should be framed as 
protecting a larger market or institution. I position maximizing institutional 
trust as a natural extension of work in regulating privacy. In a series of 
studies, I then examine (a) whether secondary uses of consumer information 
are deemed appropriate within a generalized exchange online, (b) how uses 
along a generalized versus reciprocal exchange impact institutional and 
consumer trust, and (c) whether governance mechanisms (limitations on the 
use of data such as adequate notice, auditing, non-identifiable information, 
limited storage, etc.) increase consumer trust in companies using consumer 
data. I use three empirical studies:  
1. I categorized uses of consumer data by the degree the use is 
perceived to be within a reciprocal exchange (benefit 
immediate actors) and general exchange (within furtherance 
of the institution).  
2. Using a factorial vignette survey based on secondary uses 
identified in Study 1, I examined how different governance 
mechanisms help increase the consumer trust for each use for 
both legally mandated governance and market demanded 
governance. The goal is to identify what actions data brokers 
or data aggregators can take to use the information while not 
damaging consumer trust. 
3. Finally, I ran an experiment to test if institutional trust—
which is negatively impacted by the secondary use of data—
impacts consumer economic behavior and willingness to 
engage online.  
  
 
23. Within a generalized exchange, members contribute resources (e.g., information) and receive 
benefits of the pooled resources. Nobuyuki Takahashi, The Emergence of Generalized Exchange, 105 













• Respondents find secondary uses of consumer data more 
appropriate if within a generalized exchange (academic 
research) or within a reciprocal exchange (product search 
results) or both (credit security). Secondary use of 
information can be justified outside a simple quid pro quo 
reciprocal exchange with the consumer. Most uses studied 
here are lower on both scales than using data to place ads—
the standard bearer justifying secondary use of data online. 
• While firms that use consumer data within a generalized or 
reciprocal exchange are trusted more than firms who use data 
to place ads, overall the secondary uses of consumer data 
decrease institutional trust online.  
• A specialized data broker focused on a limited number of 
uses of information reinforces the trustworthiness of firms 
using data within a generalized exchange.  
• Using privacy notices is the least effective governance 
mechanisms of those included here whereas being subject to 
an audit was as effective as using only non-personally 
identifiable information (non-PII) in improving trust. By 
being subject to an audit, data brokers were still deemed 
trustworthy even when storing information for a year.  
• Secondary uses within a generalized exchange (e.g., credit 
security or academic research) rather than outside any 
generalized exchange (marketing) impacts trust more than 
any governance mechanism such as changing from notice to 
an audit. In other words, secondary use is more important to 
trust than any attempts to govern the information flow. 
• Governance mechanisms based on market demands versus 
legal mandates are equally effective to engender trust.  
• Institutional trust online impacts a consumer’s willingness to 
engage with a specific online partner in a trust game 
experiment as well as amplifying the effectiveness of 
auditing as an effective governance mechanism to increase 
consumer trust.  
The findings have implications for public policy and practice. The flow 
of information online—the sharing, aggregation, and use of consumer 
data—need not only be justified in a simple quid-pro-quo exchange with the 











consumer but could also be justified as necessary or appropriate for the 
online market within a generalized exchange. This opens up additional 
legitimate flows of information for firms and places less pressure on firms 
to justify why the collection of information is benefiting the consumer 
specifically. However, the majority of the twenty-seven secondary uses 
studied here cannot be justified as within a general exchange (benefiting the 
broader community) or a reciprocal exchange (benefiting the consumer 
directly). And, uses of information that are not beneficial to the individual 
or necessary for the market or context were still judged inappropriate, 
violations of privacy, and as decreasing both interpersonal and institutional 
trust. The findings suggest a typology to identify what types of secondary 
uses of information are judged appropriate by consumers.  
Second, and perhaps most importantly, this paper offers an additional 
mechanism for regulating privacy to maintain institutional trust online. The 
online environment has the markers of a market where generalized 
institutional trust is important to market actors. If privacy violations hurt not 
only interpersonal trust between a consumer and a firm but also institutional 
trust online in general, then privacy would be governed similar to insider 
trading, fraud, or bribery to protect the integrity of the market rather than 
only an individual. Punishment for a privacy violation would be set to 
ensure bad behavior is curtailed and institutional trust is maintained rather 













I. REGULATING PRIVACY AND TRUST  
While the study of privacy governance has focused on different sectors, 
the types of records to be protected, or as within civil versus criminal 
courts,24 more recently, Professors Woodrow Hartzog and Neil Richards 
have taken a step back to examine how privacy governance can be justified 
either by negative or positive duties. Do market actors have an obligation to 
‘do no harm’ or do market actors have a positive obligation to foster trust?25 
Within this shift to frame privacy regulations as seeking to foster a positive 
outcome, the governance of privacy can also be seen as having different 
goals, or at different levels of analysis: (a) as protecting the individual, (b) 
as protecting relationships or transactions, or (c) as protecting a larger 
market or institution. I explore each below to understand how this shift to 
understand the role of privacy governance in support of the institution fits 
within existing work on regulating privacy and trust.  
The different layers of privacy law should be seen as parallel to the layers 
of governance in medical, financial, and cybersecurity sectors as shown in 
Table 1. Importantly, each layer or type of governance complements the 
others to achieve a regulatory goal and govern bad behavior in the market.  
  
 
24. See also the general balkanization of privacy laws into types such as government records, 
financial data, consumer data, health, etc. Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, An Overview of Privacy 
Law, in PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 1–29 (2015).  
25. Hartzog and Richards see two bodies of privacy law: torts and FIPS, which they frame as the 
‘harm’ principle and ‘control’ principle, and see both as oriented in negative terms, with the implication 
that “privacy is almost always a negative and costly concept, a harm to be avoided, or a consent to be 
obtained before something positive can happen.” Neil M Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust 
Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 437 (2016). Richards and Hartzog state, 
“[i]nstead of trying to protect us against bad things, privacy rules can be used to create good things, like 
trust. In this paper, we argue that privacy can and should be thought of as enabling trust in our essential 
information relationships.” Id. at 431. 
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other firms to protect 
the market.  
A. Regulating Privacy to Protect Individual Rights 
Many arguments for privacy governance focus on the impact on the 
individual; laws protect individuals from harm of the misuse of personal 
information26 and the desire to find protective rights.27 Individuals have a 
right to the information that describes them whether in credit reporting or 
generally.28 Similarly, Professor Danielle Citron identifies a series of 
 
26. Individuals also have a right to be protected from what Ryan Calo calls privacy harms. 
Privacy harms can be objectively measured or more subjective similar to assault or unwanted 
observation. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133 (2011).   
27. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 878 
(2002). See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 (2014).  
28. Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1623 (2013); 













individual rights such as to technological due process,29 to cyber civil 
rights,30 to protection from revenge porn,31 and to the protection from hate 
crimes online.32 As Professor Ari Waldman rightly identifies, a line of court 
cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas 
protect individuals from societal intrusion. The protection of the individual 
can be both negative, where an individuals’ private sphere is a place of 
freedom from something,33 as well as positive, where privacy is for an 
“opportunity to grow, develop, and realize our full potential as free 
persons.”34    
The justification for such privacy governance is to protect the individual 
versus the world and are similar to regulations of property rights as the 
underpinning of the financial markets or a foundational right to autonomy 
in medicine as depicted in Table 1.  
B. Regulating Privacy to Protect Relationships 
A second layer of privacy governance seeks to protect relationships or 
transactions between market actors. Individuals share information with 
others, such as friends, doctors, lawyers, and companies, and privacy rules 
expand to govern the disclosure of information within relationships. Rather 
than focusing on the individual, these governance approaches seek to ensure 
the relationship between parities respect the privacy of both and is 
sustainable.  
 First, the FTC’s notice and choice regime attempts to maximize choice 
and trust between market actors.35 In the United States, the FTC focuses on 
a firm providing adequate notice of their privacy practices in order to 
facilitate informed consumers making a choice in the market. Fixes to the 
FTC’s reliance on notice and choice to govern the relationship between 
 
FORUM WORKSHOP ON BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: MAKING ENDS MEET 3 (2013); Guide to the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE (2016), https://ico.org.uk/ 
for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/ (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
29. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 
(2008). 
30. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009). 
31. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014). 
32. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). 
33. Waldman, supra note 6, at 562. 
34. Id.  
35. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been enforcing companies’ privacy policies 
through its authority to police unfair and deceptive trade practices. CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 145 (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, 
The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2014).  
 











firms and consumers, such as adding a duty of discretion, an obligation of 
honesty, and a duty of protection and adding loyalty as an important 
concept,36 still focus on fine-tuning the relationship between data subject 
and the firm.37  
Similarly, but outside the focus on notice and consent, is the call for 
better contracting between firms and individuals in regards to privacy. As I 
have pointed out, we may desire a market of simple exchanges with online 
privacy, “where information is known, enforcement is possible, and 
uncertainty is minimal.”  However, the current online environment is one 
where identity and reputation matter and credible contracting between 
market actors is necessary.38 Importantly, the approach is to optimize the 
relationship between market actors.  
More recently, Waldman explicitly makes the transition to protect 
relationships of trust rather than protect a collection of individual rights.39 
Similarly, Richards and Hartzog “argue that privacy can and should be 
thought of as enabling trust in our essential information relationships.”40 
Professors Waldman, Richards, and Hartzog, make two shifts: first, to 
protect relationships and, second, to move from a negative right to not be 
harmed to a more positive right to be in a relationship of trust.  
This focus on governing privacy within a relationship is similar to the 
layer of regulations and rules governing the doctor-patient relationship in 
medicine or the investor-broker relationship in finance in Table 1. The aim 
is to ensure the relationship is based on trust and is sustainable. 
 
36. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 25, at 459–71.  
37. Previous issues with FIPS center on the ability of consumers to (mistakenly) sell their 
‘privacy’ too easily and too cheaply. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461, 1461–1543 (2000). The reliance on notification to communicate the terms of an exchange is 
problematic, since notices are hard to find, misleading and misinterpreted, and time consuming. Pedro 
Giovanni Leon et al., What Do Online Behavioral Advertising Privacy Disclosures Communicate to 
Users?, PROC. OF THE 2012 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC SOC. 19 (2012); Kirsten 
Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical Investigation into How Complying with a Privacy 
Notice Is Related to Meeting Privacy Expectations Online, 34 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 210, 220 
(2015); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 ISJLP 
543, 544 (2008). 
38. Martin, supra note 9. 
39. Waldman sees breaches of privacy as a breach of trust. “To this end, this Article proposes a 
robust tort for breach of confidentiality as one tool to protect privacy in a networked world and illustrates 
the functionality of this tort through a case study of privacy in previously disclosed information. 
Waldman, supra note 6, at 560.  
40. Solutions, correctly, are framed as increasing trust in information relationships through duties 
of discretion, honesty, and protection. And “modern privacy law is incomplete because from its inception 
it has failed to account for the importance of trust . . . . Trust in information relationships is necessary 













C. Regulating Privacy for Institutional Trust 
An under-examined area for privacy governance is at the market or 
institutional level. We treat interactions online as a series of exchanges with 
specific firms. Privacy, accordingly, is governed to ensure trust within those 
relationships. The focus on governing relationships can miss systemic 
harms and externalities not covered within an immediate transaction. For 
example, the collection, aggregation, and use of consumer data can create a 
perception of general surveillance, where individuals feel they are being 
watched even when they are not.41 Here we focus on how the possible bad 
acts of some decrease the institutional trust in general online. Systemic 
harms—such as the harm to institutional trust—is not captured when 
focused on a single relationship.  
Institutional trust focuses on procedural norms and structural constraints 
as enforcing good behavior rather than an individual or firm’s 
trustworthiness.42 Online, institutional trust captures the belief that there are 
impersonal structures that enable a consumer to act in anticipation of 
successful future endeavors even without clear trust signals from specific 
firms.43 With institutional trust, market actors rely on the system to take care 
of bad acts and untrustworthy behavior and to foster integrity in the market. 
Importantly, the aggregation and secondary use of consumer data, the 
subject of much concern, is performed by market actors behind the scenes 
without any relationship with consumers. Individuals therefore must trust 
‘being online’ in general.  
Institutional trust is important to allow individuals to enter new markets 
and form new relationships rather than remain with current (perhaps less 
valuable) relationships. In other words, trust in the institution relieves some 
of the pressure to find trustworthy signals in individual firms.44 For 
example, in the financial industry, “if investors believe that the stock market 
 
41. Martin, supra note 10, at 77. 
42. Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, AM. J. SOC. 623, 636 (1987). 
43. Ratnasingam et al., supra note 19, at 70. Ratnasingam, Gefen, and Pavlou propose four 
facilitating conditions to institutional trust online: (1) IT connectivity, (2) standards, (3) security, and (4) 
uniform product descriptions. Privacy was not included at the time. Id.  
44.  
Two mechanisms may encourage movement out of committed relationships in those conditions. 
First, formal contracts should serve as a safeguard to market participants, in the sense that they 
limit potential losses due to opportunistic behavior. Second, trust in general others (as opposed 
to trust in familiar people) reduces participants’ perception of hazards in market exchanges and 
hence promotes transactions among strangers. By increasing the propensity to initiate new 
exchanges, general trust also diminishes the role of contracts in causing movement out of 
committed relationships. 
Lazzarini et al., supra note 8, at 709. 
 











is systematically unfair and accords advantages to insiders and others with 
superior access to material nonpublic information, then investors may exit 
the market, to the detriment of the marketplace and society generally.”45 
Therefore insider trading, which is difficult to govern as a harm to an 
individual, 46 is governed to maintain institutional trust and the integrity of 
the securities market. In fact, Professor Laura Beny found insider trading 
laws impact ownership dispersion and that sanctions on insider trading 
impact the dispersion of ownership for top ten companies in the economy: 
“large public corporations tend to have greater ownership dispersion in 
countries whose formal insider trading laws contain greater sanctions for 
insider trading violations.”47 When individuals trust the system to take care 
of bad actors, more individuals enter the market. 
Importantly, when institutional trust matters, or when individuals need 
to believe the norms and structures will work to identify and punish bad 
actors and reward good behavior, then violations need not be justified by 
quantifying harm to an individual or a firm. Instead, crimes such as bribery, 
fraud, insider trading, and corruption are punished to maintain the integrity 
of the market and institutional trust.  
D. Research Implications 
The shift to include the online institution as an important level of analysis 
for privacy governance has two important implications.  
First, the governance of privacy online has focused on the immediate 
relationship between the consumer and what I call the gatekeeper firm.48 
Whether or not a consumer approves of the collection of their data online is 
seen as an exchange where consumers provide information and are provided 
benefits by a firm: free online content, targeted ads, better search results, 
tailored services, etc. And, the sharing, aggregation, and use of consumer 
data post-disclosure is justified as fitting within a reciprocal, quid-pro-quo 
exchange with consumers.  
However, if the online institution is an operative level of analysis to 
govern, then a generalized exchange, where the benefits received are not 
 
45. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin 
to the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 470 (2000). 
46Alternatively, insider trading laws are justified to make transaction efficient or minimize investor 
harm. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure 
Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993). 
47. Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative 
Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 166 (2005). 
48. Kirsten Martin, Data Aggregators, Consumer Data, and Responsibility Online: Who Is 













directly related to the transaction but rather are for the good of the online 
institution, may offer a better explanation of consumer exchange online.49  
A generalized exchange would suggest that consumers would approve uses 
of information that benefit a larger online community or where the purpose 
and benefits are just. For example, people fill out the U.S. Census when the 
use of the data to benefit society is explained—and not when the benefit to 
their immediate community is emphasized. Similar rationales are used to 
explain contributions to philanthropy, intergenerational exchanges, medical 
research, and consumer credit. A generalized exchange would also be 
consistent with privacy as the appropriate flow of information50 or privacy 
as a social contract51: privacy violations occur when the flow of information 
is outside a given context or violates the norms of the community.  
Within this framing, the consequences of market actors—both harms and 
benefits—are assessed within a larger institution. Does the collection and 
use of data hurt or benefit the online institution? Is the information flow 
appropriate for the general context?52 This shift to focus on the larger 
institution—and the role of privacy with institutional trust online—is in 
keeping with approaches to privacy that broaden the focus from disclosure 
to an individual to information flows within a larger community, context, 
system, or society.53   
Below, I empirically examine (a) whether secondary uses of consumer 
information are deemed appropriate along a generalized exchange online, 
(b) how uses within a generalized versus reciprocal (quid-pro-quo) 
exchange impact institutional and consumer trust, and (c) whether 
governance mechanisms (limitations on the use of data such as adequate 
notice, auditing, non-identifiable information, limited storage, etc.) increase 
consumer trust in companies using consumer data.  
 
49. Within a generalized exchange, members contribute resources (e.g., information) and receive 
benefits of the pooled resources. Takahashi, supra note 23, at 1128. 
50. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE 127 (2010). 
51. Kirsten Martin, Understanding Privacy Online: Development of a Social Contract Approach 
to Privacy, 137 J. BUS. ETHICS 551, 554–55 (2016). 
52. Nissenbaum, supra note 50, at 127. 
53. For example, Nissenbaum explicitly focuses on the context as the operative focus to 
understand if the flow of information is deemed appropriate whereas Martin focuses on the social 
contract community as determining privacy norms. See generally NISSENBAUM, supra note 50; Martin, 
supra note 51. Bambauer notes the flow and not just the handoff, explaining that “[p]ersonal information 
passes through four distinct states where regulation can apply: observation, capture (when a record is 
created), dissemination, and use.” Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 205, 209 (2012). Strahilevitz broadens the examination to an individuals’ social network. See 
generally Lior J. Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005). 
Much of surveillance scholarship also moves away from trust in a single actor towards the decisions of 
a larger community or society. Calo, supra note 10; Cohen, supra note 10, at 183; Priscilla M. Regan, 
Response to Bennett: Also in Defence of Privacy, 8 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 497, 497 (2011). 











II. STUDY 1: SECONDARY USES OF CONSUMER INFORMATION  
In order to categorize the secondary uses of information as along two 
axes—as along a generalized exchange and along a reciprocal exchange—I 
first identified a range of uses from marketing materials, government 
reports, academic research, and privacy reports. These uses can be 
categorized into 6 areas: product/marketing, risk assessment, fraud/security, 
research, people search, and political action. Table 2 contains the possible 
uses of consumer data as operationalized in this survey. 
A. Design Study 1 
After a series of control questions (gender, age, trust online, privacy 
concerns), a traditional survey was run where respondents were asked to 
rate either (A) if the use was appropriate, (B) if the use was within a 
reciprocal exchange (benefit the user directly), and (C) if the use was within 
a generalized exchange (benefit a larger community). The secondary use 
(bolded portion) was randomly assigned 30 times for each respondent as 
listed in Table 2.  
 
Prompt: For each possible use, a data broker has gathered your general 
information from browsing habits online, purchasing history (automobiles 
owned), hobbies and interests online, offline activity such as grocery purchases, 
and even type of contacts you have from social networking sites to build a 
profile. 
 
The data broker would use the information (browsing history, search results, 
purchases) to be accessible to companies conducting research to improve 
technical performance online. 
 
The respondent was assigned to one of three conditions. This rating used a 
slider and recorded a continuous rating (-100 to +100) for each. 
 
1. Appropriate Use 
Please rate the degree to which this use is appropriate. 
Not Appropriate           Appropriate 
 
2. Reciprocal Exchange 
Please rate the degree you believe this use of information would benefit you directly.  
Does Not Benefit Me     Benefits Me 
 
3. General Exchange 
Please rate the degree you believe this use of data benefits a larger community. 














Table 2: Appropriate Use of Information Categorized 








Ads Ad to determine which ad to place when you are online Personalize to personalize an ad for product you’ve searched for 
Product Offering 
FinProd to determine the type of financial product (bank account, savings plan) you will be offered 
ConsProd to determine the search results when you are looking for an item at an online retail store.  
Lead generation LeadGenUniv to generate a list of potential customers to contact for a for-profit university 
Investment 
advice CustInvestAdv to customize investment advice by a bank 








AutoIns to assess your risk for car insurance coverage 
HealthIns to determine your rate and coverage for health insurance 
Loan/Financing TVLoan to assess your risk profile for financing a large TV.  
CarLoan to assess your risk profile for a car loan.  
Employment JobApp to screen job applicants  





 Credit card for fraud prevention by your credit card company 
 IDCheck to verify your identity when filling out applications 
 Financing to verify your identity when applying for financing 
Security  
   CyberSec to look for patterns of use of hackers who are potential threats to cyber security by a private company 
  CyberSecGovt to look for patterns of use of hackers who are to cyber security by the government 




Academic AcadRsrch to be accessible to academic researchers conducting studies on individual behavior  
Private Firm 
  
ProdImpr to be accessible to companies conducting research to improve product delivery online  
TechImpr to be accessible to companies conducting research to improve technical performance online  
Public Interest 
  
EducRsrch to be accessible to academic researchers conducting studies on consumer behavior 
GovtImpr to be accessible for governments looking to improve services in their local area 
People Search  
  
  
Admissions for university admissions to gain a more fine-grained profile of applicants.  
FindPpl for people or organizations to be able to locate you for future contact 
Employment for potential employers to gain a more fine-grained profile of applicants.  
Law for law enforcement to investigate possible suspects or investigate a crime generally. 
Political Action  
  Fundraising PolFund to identify people for political fundraising 
  Information PolInfo to identify people possibly interested in mailings about a politician 











B. Results Study 1 
The results for the traditional survey—where the respondents rated the 
degree to which the use of the information by the data broker was 
appropriate, within a generalized exchange, or within a reciprocal 
exchange—are in Table 3. The average rating the secondary use was 
appropriate was -21.12, suggesting consumers on average do not find the 
secondary use by data brokers to be appropriate. 
 
Table 3: Sample Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 
 Rating = 
 Rating = Rating = 
 Appropriate Use Reciprocal Use Generalized Use 
 Survey 1 
 Survey 2 Survey 3 
N 260  269 252 
Ave Rating -21.12  -15.60 -13.89 
% Age Over 35 43%  41% 43% 
% Male 50%  50% 51% 
 
Figure 2 plots each secondary use by the average rating as within a 
generalized exchange (x-axis) and within a reciprocal exchange (y-axis). 
For example, credit security in the upper right quadrant, is judged to be 
relatively high within the generalized exchange (benefits the larger 
community) and reciprocal exchange (benefits you directly). Alternatively, 
using information for lead generation for a for-profit college is judged as 
outside both a generalized exchange and reciprocal exchange.  
In order to increase the theoretical generalizability of the ratings for 
generalized exchange and reciprocal exchange, I standardized the ratings of 
generalized exchange and reciprocal exchange (mean = 0 and s.d. = 1). The 
results are plotted in the bubble chart in Figure 2 with the size of the bubble 
equal to the degree the use is considered appropriate. The dotted line 
perimeter is above the average (ad placement is the average) where a solid 
perimeter is below the average. The size of the bubble remains the 
magnitude. As would be expected, uses with a higher score for generalized 
and reciprocal exchange were judged more appropriate (dotted outline of 
bubble—thicker as more positive). Secondary uses that were, on average, 
rated not within a generalized or reciprocal exchange were judged less 












C. Discussion Study 1 
Study 1 shows that respondents differentiate the secondary uses along 
the three dimensions—degree within a generalized or reciprocal exchange 
and the degree the use is appropriate. Further the results in Figure 2 offer 
theoretically interesting uses for the vignette survey in Study 2 (identified 
by the red arrows) in order to measure how each type of use (high and low 
ratings for generalized exchange and reciprocal exchange) impacts 
consumer trust. Study 1 illustrated that consumers differentiate the types of 
uses whereas Study 2 will measure if those differences matter to consumer 
trust and when taking into consideration possible governance policies such 
as limiting storage of information and including a review board or auditors. 
 
Figure 2: Secondary uses of data plotted using standardized scores 
(mean = 0 and s.d. = 1). Red arrows mark uses of information for 
Study 2. 
 
III. STUDY 2: VIGNETTE STUDY ON USE OF DATA AND TRUST  
Study 2 examines how secondary uses along a generalized versus 
reciprocal exchange (identified in Study 1) impact institutional and 
consumer trust. The goal is to identify what actions data brokers or data 































































Study 2 seeks to answer three broad questions:  
1. Is institutional trust impacted by the secondary use of consumer 
data?   
2. Do different types of secondary use (high versus low generalized 
and reciprocal exchange) impact trust?   
3. Do different governance policies on the use of data—limiting 
the storage, allowing data audits, etc.—impact trust in using 
consumer data?  
• Does changing from a broad-use to a specific-use data 
broker positively impact consumer trust in using data?   
• Does making the qualifications legally mandated 
versus a market demand impact consumer trust? 
Using a factorial vignette survey based on secondary uses identified in 
Study 1, I examined how different governance mechanisms help increase 
the consumer trust for each use for both legally mandated governance and 
market demanded governance. Factorial vignette surveys support varying 
multiple contextual factors simultaneously while relying on a simple 
judgment for the rating task, namely, the degree to which the described data 
broker is trusted. Factorial vignette surveys present respondents with 
randomly generated vignettes in which experimentally designed factors—
the independent variables—are systematically varied across the vignettes.54 
Respondents rated forty vignettes randomly created with replacement and 
were given the same rating task for all vignettes. 
A. Design Study 2 
1. Vignette Factors (Independent Variables in the Vignette)   
 
a. Secondary Use. Five conceptually distinct secondary uses of 
information were chosen from Study 1 as depicted in Figure 3. Ad 
placement is both practically relevant and theoretically interesting 
as the use with the average score for appropriateness. I also chose a 
secondary use from each quadrant from the bubble chart in Figure 





54. Guillermina Jasso, Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Beliefs and Judgments, 34 SOC. 












Figure 3 – Uses of information for vignette study based on results of 
Study 1. 
 
b. Governance Mechanisms. A range of protective measures for the 
consumer was included in order to identify which practices would 
positively impact consumer trust. Adequate notification55 was 
included as well as a review board,56 professional data scientist,57 
an auditor,58 and non-PII.59 Non-PII techniques were included to 
identify the how alternatives compared to the most ‘protective’ 
measure in theory—without any comment on the feasibility.  
 
c. Storage. The duration the information was stored varied from one 
month to ten years to capture another protective measure. 
 
2. Vignette Design   
 
Template60: 
A data broker collects consumer [Information] from online and 
offline sources for later use including [Secondary Use]. The 
 
55. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does “Notice and Choice” Disclosure Regulation Work? An 
Empirical Study of Privacy Policies (Univ. of Michigan Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 13, 2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawandeconomics/workshops/Do 
cuments/Paper13.Marotta-Wurgler.Does%20Notice%20and%20Choice%20Disclosure%20Work.pdf; 
Kirsten Martin, Do Privacy Notices Matter? Comparing the Impact of Violating Formal Privacy Notices 
and Informal Privacy Norms on Consumer Trust Online, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 192 (2016). 
56. See generally Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment, 66 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 97 (2013). 
57. Martin, supra note 10, at 84. 
58. Megan Gray, Understanding and Improving Privacy “Audits” Under FTC Orders, 
STANFORD CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y BLOG (April 2018), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2018/04 
/understanding-improving-privacy-audits-under-ftc-orders.  
59. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Myths and Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable 
Information”, 53 COMM. ACM 24, 24–26 (2010). 
60. Information Type. Two information types were included: consumers’ preferences and 




































company stores the information to use for [Duration]. Based on 
recent regulations, the company also [Governance Mechanism].  
 
Example: 
A data broker collects consumer preferences (app use, browsing 
history, social network activities) from online and offline sources 
for later use including for fraud prevention by credit card 
companies.  
 
The company stores the information to use for one month.  
 
Based on recent regulations, the company also is audited by an 
accounting firm to ensure the use of data is consistent with stated 
goals. 
 
Table 4: Vignette Factors for Study 2. 




Credit Security  For fraud prevention by credit card companies/ fraud prevention 
Acad. Research to support researchers conducting studies on individual behavior/ academic research 
Ad  to determine which ad to place when you are online/ marketing 
Consumer Product to determine the search results when you are looking for an item at an online retail store/ retail support 
Lead Generation 
Univ 
to generate a list of potential customers to contact for 





Non-identifiable Summarizes the data so that it is not identifiable and 
can only make general predictions.  
Professionalization Uses a data certified professional (similar to a CPA) 
on all data use projects  
Review Board gets the approval of a review board before new 
analysis or uses of identifiable consumer data. 
Audited Is audited by an accounting firm to ensure the use of 
data is consistent with stated goals.  
Notice Explains how they gather and use of consumer data 
in a notice on their website.  
Duration Time 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years 
 
3. Rating Task  
 
The respondents rated their degree of trust in the data broker by scoring 













4. 2x2 Design  
 
Four factorial vignette surveys were run as depicted in Figure 4. First, 
the type of data broker was either a broad use data broker or a specific use 
data broker tied to the use assigned for that vignette. This captures any 
benefit to data brokers specializing in a type of use or a specific market. 
Second, the governance mechanism—notification, audit, non-PII, etc.—
was either due to a legal mandate or a market demand. This captured 
whether market or non-market actions were more effective at engendering 
trust.61  
 



















































Table 5: Sample Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 (also depicts order 
of questions) 
Data Broker Specific Broad Specific Broad 
Requirement Legal Legal Market Market 
 Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4 
N 476 510 482 520 
% Male 53% 49% 58% 53% 
% Age Over 35 46% 46% 43% 40% 
Ave Rating (40 vignettes) -4.6 -6.1 -3.1 -6.7 
Trust Online (Base = 
+12.4) -22.6 -20.5 -19.5 -21.3 
Privacy Concern  54.9 57.1 53.9 54.7 
Privacy Important  75.9 77.3 75.9 78.1 
B. Results Study 2 
1. Consumer Trust in a Firm  
To test if the secondary use of data—as along a continuum of reciprocal 
and generalized exchange—impacts consumer trust, the trust rating task was 
regressed on the vignette factors and the results are in Table 6 for the 
specific use and broad use data broker. The results show that secondary uses 
of information that were rated as within a reciprocal exchange (consumer 
product use = 3.46, p<0.001), generalized exchange (academic research = 
20.42, p<0.001), or both (credit security = 24.89, p<0.001) positively 
impact trust compared to using information to place an ad. The secondary 
use that was rated as outside either a reciprocal and generalized exchange 
(lead generation for a for profit university) negatively impacts trust (-11.67, 













Table 6: Regression of consumer trust rating task on vignette factors 
Regression Results Specific Use Data Broker  Broad Use Data Broker 
 Coef p Coef p 
PurchaseInfo 0.00 0.99 -0.27 0.60 
(Null = Preference)     
     
StorageTime -5.05 0 -6.23 0 
     
AcadRsrchUse 20.42 0 13.53 0 
ConsProdUse 3.46 0 6.42 0 
CreditSecUse 24.89 0 19.17 0 
LeadGenUnivUse -11.67 0 -11.94 0 
(Null = Ad)     
     
AuditQual 9.67 0 6.85 0 
NonIDQual 12.29 0 7.56 0 
ProfessionQual 5.37 0 2.06 0.01 
ReviewBrdQual 3.41 0 1.63 0.05 
(Null = Notice)     
_cons -3.03 0.091 3.36 0.06 
 
2. Governance Mechanisms  
 
a. Specific Use versus Broad Use Data Brokers  
 
In addition, stating the data broker is targeted to a specific use amplifies 
the benefit of secondary uses within a generalized exchange as shown in 
Figure 5 (Credit Security Use c2 = 13.13, p<0.001; Academic Research c2 
= 18.31, p<0.001). Secondary use within a generalized exchange (for the 
general benefit) is perceived as increasing trust—particularly if data broker 
is specialized. 
All proposed governance mechanisms—using a review board, hiring a 
professional data scientist, storing only non-PII, being subject to an audit -- 
were an improvement to increasing trust compared to adequate notification 
(the current default governance mechanism in the U.S.). Figure 6 illustrates 
the relative importance of each governance mechanism to consumer trust 
compared to adequate notice. Using an auditor or anonymized data has a 
larger impact on trust when the data broker is specialized over a broad use 
data broker. Governance mechanisms are more impactful to consumer trust 
with a specific use data broker compared to a broad use data broker.  












Figure 5: Types of Use: Generalized versus Reciprocal exchange 
 
 
Figure 6: Coefficients of vignette factors – Use and Qualifiers – by 
type of data broker. 
 
 
However, Figure 7 plots the average trust rating for each governance 
mechanism by high generalized exchange use (academic research or credit 
security) and low generalized exchange use (consumer product placement 
and lead generation). Figure 7 illustrates the (relatively) greater impact of 
the type of use compared to any change in the qualifier included. The impact 
on trust from a generalized exchange use (difference between solid and 
dashed line) is greater than any change in qualifiers (changes along a line). 
Specifically, the coefficient for high exchange uses (credit security and 
academic research) are significantly larger than the benefit of the top 
qualifiers (non-PII and auditor).62  
 

































Coefficient in Regression of Trust Rating Task on Vignette Factors 
BROAD USE DATA BROKER













Figure 7: Trust rating for each qualifier by type of secondary use. 
 
 
Previously, storage of consumer data has been judged inappropriate 
when measured in surveys with consumers deeming any storage more than 
a week to be a violation of trust or inappropriate.63 To test how the different 
qualifiers may extend the amount of storage deemed to still be trustworthy 
behavior, the trust rating for each duration of storage by each qualifier is 
plotted in Figure 8. I find that using an auditor led consumers to still trust 
firms even if data is stored up to a year (all else being equal). NB using 
merely a notice replicates previous findings that almost any storage is not 
seen as trustworthy behavior.  
Governance mechanisms are important but do not make up for the trust 




mechanism of being subject to an audit (c2 = 15.03, p<0.00) or non-PII (c2 = 4.97, p<0.03). Similarly, 
the positive impact of using data for credit security use is greater than the governance mechanism of 
being subject to an audit (c2 = 59.14, p<0.00) or including only non-PII (c2 = 36.53, p<0.00). 








































Figure 8: Trust rating for storage duration by qualifier – using an 
auditor led consumers to still trust even if stored up to a year (all else 
being equal). 
 
3. Institutional Trust  
First, respondents’ institutional trust online—the degree to which they 
agreed with the statement “[i]n general, I trust websites online”—was 
diminished with the mere description of secondary uses of consumer data. 
For each survey run as described in Table 5, the average trust online was -
19.5 to -22.6 as compared to a null condition of +12.4 (when respondents 
are asked without having to judge the vignettes). The results illustrate that 
institutional trust is negatively impacted by secondary uses of data when the 
consumers are merely informed about the use of data. This could also be 
because the secondary uses of data were, on average, deemed not 
appropriate from Survey 1.  
In addition, respondents’ institutional trust in websites impacts the 
effectiveness of governance policies. To identify high- and low-trusting 
respondents, I split the sample into quartiles based on the rating of the 
institutional trust question. Respondents in the top 25% were categorized as 
high trusting and respondents in the lowest 25% were used in the analysis 
as low trusting respondents. Table 7 includes the coefficients for the 
regression of the trust rating task on the vignette factors for each subsample. 
Secondary use within the general exchange (benefiting the greater good) has 
a bigger impact on the trust rating for low trusting respondents. On the other 
hand, the introduction of low general exchange uses (e.g., lead generation) 






































Table 7: Coefficients for Secondary Use Factors (from Vignette) for 
High Trust (top 25% of respondents) and Low Trust (bottom 25%) 
Respondents 
 High Trust  
 Low Trust  
 Respondents Respondents  
 N = 260  N = 269 
 
Generalized Exch Use     
Academic Research Use +9  +20 (c
2 = 28.14, p<0.00)  
Credit Security Use +14  +26 (c
2 = 22.88, p<0.00) 
Reciprocal Exch Use    
 
Consumer Prod Use +3  +4 (c
2 = 1.7, p=0.19) 
Lead Generation Univ Use -15  -7 (c2 =19.31, p<0.00) 
 
In addition, the impact of using a legal mandate (the governance 
mechanism is through compliance to regulation) versus market demand (the 
qualifier is a competitive advantage) is tested by comparing the trust rating 
of scenarios across two distinct samples of the survey. The results show that 
respondents find no difference in trust if a qualifier is implemented in 
compliance with a regulation versus in response to competitive forces. 
Figure 9 illustrates the different trust ratings for low trusting and high 
trusting respondents (by quartile) for both market demanded and legally 
required qualifiers and the respondents did not differentiate the source of 
the qualification.  
  











Figure 9: Trust rating for each type of trust respondents (lowest 
quartile to highest quartile) by source of the qualifier (market v legal). 
 
C. Discussion Study 2 
Typical secondary uses of information negatively impact both consumer 
trust in a firm and institutional trust online. However, justifying the flow of 
information based on benefits to the overall system holds promise. 
Secondary use within a generalized exchange has a significant positive 
impact on consumer trust; changing the type of secondary use to a 
generalized exchange has a larger impact on trust than any governance 
mechanism included. In terms of possible policies to govern data flows for 
trust, auditing was found to be a significant improvement on consumer trust 
compared to adequate notice. Finally, whether the governance mechanism 
is due to legal requirements or market demands does not impact trust, 
meaning an industry or market solution may be as effective as a regulatory 
protection.  
IV. STUDY 3: EXPERIMENT  
Study 1 measured whether respondents differentiated, and positively 
judged, secondary uses of consumer data within a generalized exchange 
versus a reciprocal exchange. Study 2 then tested the importance of those 
secondary uses of information to consumer trust while taking into 
consideration possible governance mechanisms—e.g., duration of storage, 
specialized data broker, auditing practices, etc. Study 3 now examines the 
importance of secondary uses of information, governance mechanisms 






































In order to further test the finding that the secondary uses with a low 
generalized exchange score are a breach of consumer trust, I sought to 
measure the impact of secondary use of consumer data for marketing on the 
trust behavior or a consumer’s willingness to engage. Here I utilized the 
“Trust Game” to measure trust in a firm.64 The respondent is assigned to be 
one player (Player 1) and plays the game online with a ‘website’ (Player 2) 
designed with particular attributes. Player 1 must decide to become 
vulnerable to Player 2 by passing the initial amount of money and trusting 
Player 2 will share the proceeds back.  
Participants were told they would play four rounds with the same partner, 
and each participant made four separate decisions. Each round of the 
scenario occurred in two stages as shown in Figure 10. Player 1 was 
endowed with $0.30 at the start of each round. Player 1 then made the first 
decision and could pass $0.30 or take $0.30. If Player 1 chose ‘‘Take,”, they 
earned $0.30, Player 2 earned $0, and the round ended. If Player 1 chose 
‘‘Pass’’ (Trust), the amount of money grew to $0.90, and Player 2 decided 
whether or not to share the $0.90 with Player 1 ($.45 for each). In each 
round, Player 1 indicated their choice.  
The respondent was assigned to be Player 1 and would decide whether 
or not to trust Player 2 by passing the endowed/initial amount. The outcome 
was binary (0/1) as the respondent could only pass or not pass to Player 2. 
The experiment measures actual trust behavior rather than a trust judgment 
or trust intent. Standard controls from the previous surveys were used. 
 
Figure 10: Diagram of Trust Game Experiment to Measure 




64. Vital Anderhub, Dirk Engelmann, & Werner Güth, An Experimental Study of the Repeated 
Trust Game with Incomplete Information, 48 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 197, 197–216 (2002); Joyce 
Berg, John Dickhaut, & Kevin McCabe, Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. 

























A. Design Study 3 
American participants (N=1,014) were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Each participant received $1.00 for taking the survey 
regardless of the outcome of the experimental game. In addition, 
respondents would receive a bonus of up to $0.50 based on the results of the 
experiment. In order to test the impact of changing the secondary use (high 
and low generalized exchange) and qualifier (notice or audit) utilized, a 2x2 
design was employed as depicted in Figure 11. Respondents were assigned 
to one condition for the description of Player 2. The descriptive statistics of 
each condition subsample is in Table 8.  
 
Figure 11: Possible backgrounds for Player 2 (respondent was 






















































B. Results Study 3 
Table 8: Sample Descriptive Statistics for Study 3 







Qualifier: Null Audit Notice Audit Notice 
 Condition 0 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Condition 4 
N 202 210 206 180 216 
% Age Over 35 43% 40% 38% 48% 38% 
% Male 61% 55% 57% 67% 67% 
Trust Online 9.31 15.30 6.85 14.52 16.18 
Privacy 
Important 69.37 75.15 75.23 73.59 70.47 
 
The impact of using information for security (high generalized 
exchange) as compared to marketing (low generalized exchange) remains 
positive with 65% passing to Player 2 in the initial round (Initial % Passed 
$ in Table 8) for the security condition versus 58% for the marketing 
condition (both using the auditor) which is consistent with the factorial 
vignette survey findings in Study 2. Interestingly, the switch to adequate 
notification rather than using an auditor does not impact the percent of 
respondents that initially trust to 61% (compared to 65%).  
Institutional trust matters to a consumer’s willingness to engage with a 
stranger. Figure 12 depicts the percent of respondents who pass money to 
Player 2 in round one. Respondents who self-describe as having greater 
institutional trust online are more willing to trust Player 2 across scenarios: 
from 62% (low trust) to 78% (high trust). 
For the governance mechanisms, being audited is an improvement for all 
respondents but is a larger improvement in trust for those with greater 
institutional trust. In other words, auditing is particularly useful in 
improving trust for those with high institutional trust. Finally, the impact of 
using consumer data for security (rated as good for the community) over to 
generate leads (rated as not good for the community) is equally important 
for all respondents equally.  
C. Discussion Study 3 
The findings extend the work in Studies 1 and 2 by illustrating the 
importance of institutional trust to a consumer’s willingness to engage with 
a new market actor online. Respondents with high institutional trust were 
significantly more likely to trust Player 2 (78%) over those with low 
institutional trust (62%). Further, the governance mechanism of using an 











auditor to ensure trustworthy behavior was more effective for those 
respondents with high institutional trust: 76% of respondents with high 
institutional trust were willing to trust Player 2 when they are subject to an 
auditor compared to only 57% willing to trust Player 2 when they are only 
required to give adquate notice.  
 
Figure 12: Percent who trust Player 2 in Round One for Respondents 
with Low to High Institutional trust. 
 
 
Figure 13: Percent who trust Player 2 for Low and High Trusting 












































Figure 14: Percent who trust Player 2 for Low and High Trusting 
Respondents by type of secondary use of data. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Over these studies, I found the following: 
Respondents find secondary uses of consumer data more appropriate if 
within a generalized exchange (academic research) or within a reciprocal 
exchange (product search results) or both (credit security). This is contrary 
to a general assumption that individual have no expectation of privacy post 
disclosure.65 Secondary use of information can be justified outside a simple 
quid-pro-quo reciprocal exchange with the consumer. Secondary uses 
within a generalized exchange (e.g., credit security or academic research) 
rather than outside any generalized exchange (marketing) impacts trust 
more than any governance mechanism such as changing from notice to an 
audit. In other words, secondary use is more important to trust than any 
attempts to govern the information flow. 
In general, a specialized data broker focused on a limited number of uses 
of information reinforces the trustworthiness of firms using data within a 
generalized exchange.  
Interestingly, considering the focus on notice and choice in the U.S., 
using privacy notices is the least effective governance mechanisms of those 
included here whereas being subject to an audit was as effective as using 
only non-PII in improving trust. By being subject to an audit, data brokers 
were still deemed trustworthy even when storing information for a year.  
In regard to institutional trust, while firms that use consumer data within 
a generalized or reciprocal exchange are trusted more than firms who use 
data to place ads, overall the use of consumer data for secondary uses 
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decreases institutional trust online. Institutional trust online impacts a 
consumer’s willingness to engage with a specific online partner in a trust 
game experiment as well as amplifying the effectiveness of auditing as an 
effective governance mechanism to increase consumer trust. 
These three studies reinforce the need to understand how individuals 
judge the secondary uses of consumer data as trafficked online and animates 
a new focus on the role of respecting privacy expectations in institutional 
trust. The results have implications for governing privacy.  
A. Institutional Trust and Privacy Violations 
This paper presents results that should animate how we think about 
penalizing privacy violations by firms. Until now, privacy violations—or 
the inappropriate collection, sharing, and use of information outside privacy 
norms—is measured by a breach of a privacy notice or the possible harm to 
a consumer.  
The arguments and findings herein suggest that privacy governance 
should also be focused on ensuring institutional trust online. The mere 
description of secondary uses negatively impacted consumer institutional 
trust online. And institutional trust is important online not only theoretically 
due to the structure of the online markets (anonymous data traffickers 
exchanging consumer data with the consumer at an information 
disadvantage), but Study 3 illustrates how important institutional trust is to 
have a consumer engage with a new market actor online.  
Regulating for institutional trust would require punishing privacy 
violators not only for any tangible harm to an individual but in order to 
maintain the integrity of the online market. The Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulates insider trading “because insider trading 
undermines investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities 
market”66 in a manner similar to the regulation and prosecution of 
corruption in politics, bribing in foreign markets, and even cybersecurity 
incidents. Each are investigated and punished to maintain institutional trust 
in the market and not to right a wrong done to a particular person.  
Importantly, this shift to justify regulating privacy-violating behavior 
and associated punishments based on institutional trust and integrity of the 
online market would alleviate the problem of identifying specific harms 
needed to punish privacy violations.67 In addition, policies would then focus 
on the need for information flows to support the integrity of the online 
 
66. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Insider Trading, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/addi 
tional-resources/general-resources/glossary/insider-trading (last visited Jan. 3, 2019). 














Institutional trust promotes greater participation in generalized exchange 
systems,69 yet consumers currently lack trust in online advertising firms, and 
74% of online consumers takes steps to limit access to their information 
through obfuscation or anti-tracking mechanisms.70 Not surprisingly, calls 
for firms who collect, store, and aggregate consumer information to act as 
fiduciaries71 captures the need for firms to actively cultivate consumer trust 
in order to maintain and use consumer information.72 With more scrutiny on 
tracking firms as information fiduciaries via regulators and consumers, 
identifying what uses and limitations are considered appropriate will help 
tracking firms match consumer preferences and give guidance to what 
information fiduciary should do to foster trust.  
This paper offers an additional mechanism for regulating privacy to 
maintain institutional trust online. The online environment has the markers 
of a market where generalized institutional trust is important to market 
actors. If privacy violations hurt not only interpersonal trust between a 
consumer and a firm but also institutional trust online, then privacy would 
be governed similar to insider trading, fraud, or bribery to protect the 
integrity of the market rather than only an individual. Punishment for a 
privacy violation would be set to ensure bad behavior is curtailed and 




68. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1012–15 (2014). 
69. Toshio Yamagishi & Karen S. Cook, Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas, 56 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. Q. 235, 245 (1993); Takahashi, supra note 23, at 1106–07. 
70. Richards and Hartzog rightly see obfuscation as fostering distrust. But it is the fault of the 
institutions and firms for not being trustworthy. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 5, at 1208; MARY 
MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE STATE OF PRIVACY IN POST-SNOWDEN AMERICA (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/J 
Q39-BTE4]; Finn Brunton & Helen Nissenbaum, Vernacular Resistance to Data Collection and 
Analysis: A Political Theory of Obfuscation, 16 FIRST MONDAY 1, 7 (2011). See generally HELEN F. 
NISSENBAUM & FINN BRUNTON, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015). 
71. See generally Richard R. W. Brooks, Observability & Verifiability: Informing the 
Information Fiduciary (Working Paper, 2015). See also Richards & Hartzog, supra note 25 at 457. 
72. Consumer data brokers and aggregators as having fiduciary duties is not without criticism. 
See Jane R. Bambauer, The Relationships between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C.D. L. REV. 1941, 1950–
53 (2016). 
73. One downside of institutional trust or regulations specifically is that actors are not able to 
build trusting relationships. “Indeed, financial regulation and governance concerns impersonal or system 
trust and thus involves strategies to constrain agents’ behavior to reduce risks and uncertainty, acting as 
functional substitutes for interpersonal or relationship trust.” Nicole Gillespie & Robert Hurley, Trust 
and the Global Financial Crisis, in ADVANCES IN TRUST RESEARCH 193 (2013). 











B. Secondary Use of Data 
Previous work on privacy in public has mistakenly viewed individuals 
as relinquishing privacy expectations post-disclosure as to who has access 
to data and how information is used.74 In the law, the plain view and third 
party doctrines equate even possible disclosure to others to individuals 
having no expectations of privacy.75 However, here consumers differentiate 
types of secondary uses of information and deemed the majority of uses as 
inappropriate—even after disclosure. Most uses studied here are lower on 
both scales than using data to place ads—the standard bearer justifying 
secondary use of data online. Further, the average degree the secondary uses 
were deemed appropriate was negative (judged not appropriate). While uses 
can be justified outside the standard reciprocal exchange, the majority of the 
uses are deemed neither good for the consumer nor society. Individuals have 
strong privacy expectations as to how information is used even after the 
disclosure of information. 
In addition, the results offer a meaningful typology for secondary uses 
as along two scales: as within a reciprocal exchange and as within a 
generalized exchange. The typology is significant in predicting if the 
secondary use is deemed appropriate or not. Such judgments are critical for 
regulations such as the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) which relies upon “legitimate interests” of consumers 
and firms to justify gathering and using consumer information without 
consent.76  
This typology of secondary uses is also meaningful in predicting if 
consumers trust data brokers in the study. How information is used is more 
impactful on consumer trust than any other governance mechanism such as 
deleting data, having a specialized data broker, auditing the firm, hiring a 
professional data scientist, etc.  
The findings have implications for public policy and practice. The flow 
of information online need not only be justified in a simple quid-pro-quo 
 
74. Professors Martin and Nissenbaum have conducted a series of studies to show how 
individuals have nuanced privacy expectations about their data after disclosure and when in “public.” 
See Martin & Nissenbaum, supra note 3; Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Measuring Privacy: 
Using Context to Expose Confounding Variables, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 176 (2017). 
75. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 565 (2009); 
Monu Bedi, The Fourth Amendment Disclosure Doctrines, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 461 
(2017). 
76. This finding fits with Beales and Muris’s argument that notification is not necessary for 
sharing information for the good of the context such as banking or education as well as the GDPR’s 
concept of legitimate interest: such sharing is well within the privacy expectations of individuals when 
interacting within a particular, defined context. J. Howard Beales & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or 
Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 133–34 (2008); 












exchange with the consumer but could also be justified as necessary or 
appropriate for the online context within a generalized exchange. This opens 
up additional legitimate flows of information for firms and places less 
pressure on firms to justify why the collection of information is benefiting 
the consumer specifically. However, the majority of secondary uses cannot 
be justified as within a general exchange (benefiting the broader 
community) or a reciprocal exchange (benefiting the consumer directly). 
Uses of information that are not beneficial to the individual or necessary for 
the context were still judged inappropriate, violations of privacy, and as 
decreasing both interpersonal and institutional trust. These findings suggest 
that some uses of consumer data—deemed well outside either a generalized 
or reciprocal exchange—would be candidates for being outside minimum 
standards of acceptable market behavior. And the study suggests that either 
regulation or industry self-regulation could be valid governance 
mechanisms.  
C. Governance Mechanisms 
Consumers express concern about who has access to and later uses 
information about their activities online,77 and regulations on data 
processors—those data brokers aggregating and using consumer data—
have arrived.78 While adequate notice is a popular regulation of privacy in 
the U.S.,79 notice was the least effective governance mechanism at 
engendering trust compared to using an auditor, hiring a professional data 
scientist, utilizing a review board, and keeping anonymized data. This 
finding is in keeping with the scholars who find privacy notices as a 
mechanism for distrust80 and find notices to be so ambiguous as to be 
ineffective.81 For governing privacy for consumer trust, these alternative 
governance mechanisms are worthy of further examination either within 
private or public ordering.  
Relatedly, each governance mechanism offered was equally effective at 
engendering consumer trust in a firm whether by legal mandate or due to 
competitive forces. But specialized data brokers do enhance the 
 
77. Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ 
[https://perma.cc/JQ39-BTE4]. 
78. Overview of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), supra note 28.  
79. As noted by FTC Commissioner Edith Ramirez, “[c]ompanies should be more open, clear, 
and transparent about their data practices so that consumers can . . . exercise greater control.” Mike 
Orcutt, FTC Chairwoman: We Must Not Give Up on Privacy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 10, 2016), https://w 
ww.technologyreview.com/s/602474/ftc-chairwoman-we-must-not-give-up-on-privacy/?utm_campaig 
n=add_this&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=post [https://perma.cc/6Q6U-WY9G]. 
80. Martin, supra note 55, at 193. 
81. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 55, at 5. See also Martin, supra note 37, at 220.  











trustworthiness of firms that keep secondary use of data within a generalized 
exchange. One area for a possible competitive advantage with data brokers 
is to become more specialized based on the types of appropriate secondary 
uses of consumer data as measured in studies.  
However, secondary use of information is still the elephant in the room 
for firms worried about trust. In many ways, the addition of governance 
mechanisms, such as an audit or including a review board, is akin to the 
saying “putting lipstick on a pig”: there is only so much that can be done in 
terms of governance to achieve consumer trust with secondary uses of 
consumer data that are deemed to be inappropriate and privacy violations. 
The majority of popular secondary uses by data brokers are well outside the 
legitimate interests of consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper explored how privacy governance should also be framed as 
protecting a larger market or institution. In doing so, I suggest two paths 
forward. First, we should look to justify legitimate information flows and 
secondary uses of information as not only reciprocal exchanges which are 
good for the consumer, but also as generalized exchanges which are good 
for the context or institution. Second, privacy violations should be framed 
as detrimental to market integrity and institutional trust, and pursued similar 
to violations such as insider trading, bribery, and corruption to thereby 
maintain consumers’ institutional trust and engagement online.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss6/9
